How to Check an Invoice PDF Before Payment: AP Workflow

This article is a snapshot – content was accurate as of January 2026 (code examples tested against the API as of January 2026). The product evolves actively; specific counts, examples, and detection rules may have changed since publication – see the changelog for the current state.
The moment before you click ‘Pay’ is the last point where a bad invoice can still be stopped. Once the transfer leaves your account, recovery is slow and often impossible. Yet many teams approve payments from a PDF that arrived by email and nobody has examined as a file.
This is written for the clerk or approver at the payment run, and the decision is release or hold. It is a short working procedure: what to do with an invoice PDF, in what order, before money moves. The schemes are covered in the five types of invoice fraud, the cases to rehearse in five altered-invoice cases, and the budget argument in the business case for a check.
According to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, business email compromise – very often an invoice or bank-detail swap – accounts for billions of dollars in reported losses every year. The pattern is consistent: the invoice looks right, the deadline is tight, and nobody checks the file or the bank details through a second channel.
Two checks, two different questions
A pre-payment review has to answer two separate questions, and one check cannot answer both:
- Is this file the document the sender produced? A file check answers this. It looks at the PDF itself for evidence that it was edited after it was created.
- Do these bank details belong to the vendor I mean to pay? Only an independent confirmation answers this. No analysis of a file can tell you who owns an account number.
An altered invoice fails the first question. An invoice fabricated from scratch by a fraudster, or sent from a compromised mailbox with a perfectly clean file, can pass the first and fails the second. That is why the workflow below uses both, in a fixed order.
The accounts-payable workflow
Run these steps for every invoice above your payment threshold, and for every invoice that changes a bank account, regardless of amount.
Step 1: Capture the file as received
Save the original PDF exactly as it arrived – the attachment from the email, or the file downloaded from the vendor portal. Do not open it in an editor and re-save it, print it to PDF, or take a screenshot. Any of those replaces the evidence with a new file. Keep the original email with its headers so the sender address and delivery path stay on record.
Step 2: Run the file check
Upload the original PDF to HTPBE?. It reports whether the file shows evidence of modification and names what it found, in plain terms. Run it before anyone starts keying the invoice into the payment system, so the result is on file before the amount and account number are in front of the approver.
If your invoices arrive in volume, the same check runs through the HTPBE? API at intake, so every PDF is checked before it reaches an approver. See pricing for credit packs and subscriptions.
Step 3: Read the result for what it is
A file check is evidence about the file. The next section covers what each verdict means and what it does not; the short version is that a clean file lowers one risk and leaves the other untouched.
Step 4: Compare the invoice with your own records
Take the vendor name, remittance details, invoice number and amount from the invoice and compare them with the vendor master file and purchase order – never with another document from the same email. Look for:
- an account number, IBAN or sort code that differs from the one you last paid
- a bank name or country that does not fit the vendor
- an invoice number that repeats, skips or changes format
- an amount or payee that does not match the purchase order or contract
Step 5: Confirm bank details out of band
This is the step that stops payment redirection. Whenever the bank details are new or different, confirm them by calling the vendor on a phone number from your own records – the vendor master file, a contract, or an earlier verified contact. Never use a number, email address or ‘updated contact’ from the invoice or from the message that carries it. Ask the contact to read the account details back, and write down who confirmed and when.
Do the same when the details are unchanged but the invoice arrived from an address you have not seen before. Large or one-off payments deserve the call even when everything else looks routine. If the vendor cannot be reached or does not know about the invoice, the invoice does not get paid.
Step 6: Decide, and record why
Act on the file verdict like this: with INTACT, continue to the records comparison and the call. With INCONCLUSIVE, the decision rests on the records comparison and the out-of-band confirmation; it is not an automatic rejection. With MODIFIED, pay only after the vendor has explained the change through a known channel and you hold a clean original. Approve payment when the remaining checks agree. Store the verdict, the name of the person who confirmed the bank details and the approval together with the invoice. If any step fails, hold the payment and escalate – see the section on what to do when something is wrong.
The recorded evidence also matters after the fact. If a payment is later disputed, a record showing that the file was checked and the bank details were confirmed by phone is far better than a note that someone looked at it.
A worked example
The following is an illustrative scenario, not a real case.
A mid-size distributor receives a monthly invoice from a packaging supplier it has paid for two years. This month the email arrives from the usual contact, a few days before the due date, with a short line: ‘Please note our bank details have changed – new account below.’
The AP clerk follows the workflow:
- She saves the PDF straight from the email, without opening it in an editor.
- She uploads it to HTPBE?. The verdict is MODIFIED: the file shows evidence of changes after it was created.
- She holds the invoice and does not reply to the sender. She does not need to work out the technical cause herself; the vendor has to explain the change.
- She calls the supplier on the number in the vendor master file. The account manager has never sent a bank-detail change and has not seen this invoice in that form.
- She forwards the original email to IT and the finance controller, and the genuine invoice is requested from the supplier through the portal.
Two things protected the company. The file check flagged the document before the new account number was keyed in. The phone call to a known number would have caught the same fraud even if the file check had come back clean – because a convincing replacement invoice can be built from scratch. Neither step alone would be enough; together they usually are.
The decision grid for the payment run
The verdict and the state of the bank details together decide the action. Neither alone is enough.
| File verdict | Bank details match the vendor master | Bank details new or different |
|---|---|---|
| INTACT | Release under normal approval | Hold. Callback on a known number, cooling-off period, second approver |
| INCONCLUSIVE | Read the stated reason against what this supplier normally sends. If it fits the baseline, release; if not, ask the supplier for a fresh copy from its system | Hold. Callback, and do not release on the file alone |
| MODIFIED | Hold. The supplier explains the change through a known channel and you hold a clean original | Hold. Treat as an incident: escalate before anything is paid |
A second worked example: the inconclusive path
Also illustrative. A small marketing agency invoices a company $2,380 each month. The PDF is built in an office suite and emailed by the owner. The check returns INCONCLUSIVE, with a reason that points to consumer-software origin. The clerk follows the grid:
- Bank details on the invoice match the vendor master, which has not changed in two years.
- The amount matches the purchase order.
- The last eight invoices from this agency were produced the same way. For this supplier, consumer-software origin is the baseline, not a signal.
- The clerk releases the payment and writes a one-line note: ‘Inconclusive, consumer-software origin, matches supplier history, details unchanged.’
Now the same result from a national telecom supplier that always sends a portal-generated file. Nothing about the bank details has changed, but the origin does not fit the supplier. The clerk does not accuse anyone. She asks the supplier to send the invoice again from its portal, and holds the payment until the clean copy arrives. Same verdict, opposite action – because the decision rests on the supplier’s history and not on the label.
The sign-off record and the time it takes
Attach these to the invoice, so a later audit or a disputed payment can be reconstructed:
- Check ID and verdict, with the stated reason for an inconclusive one
- Who compared the details with the vendor master, and the result
- Who made the callback, which number was used, when, and what was confirmed
- Who approved, and who released
Illustrative timing for a mid-sized AP team: capturing the file and running the check about two minutes, the records comparison about three, and the callback ten to fifteen minutes only when it is triggered by new details, a modified or unexplained file, or a high-value payment. A typical unchanged invoice therefore costs about five minutes of attention; the long calls are reserved for the few that need them.
What a result means
HTPBE? returns one of three verdicts for a PDF. A MODIFIED verdict comes with named markers explaining what was found; an INCONCLUSIVE verdict comes with the reason the check could not be applied. There is no numeric risk score.
| Verdict | What it tells you | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| INTACT | No evidence of modification was found in the file. | Continue with the records comparison and the out-of-band confirmation. |
| MODIFIED | The file shows evidence of changes after it was created. | Hold the payment until the vendor explains the change through a known channel and you hold a clean original. |
| INCONCLUSIVE | The file-integrity check does not apply to the way this file was produced; the reason is shown with the result. | Treat the file as unverified and rely on the independent confirmation. |
The verdict is about the file, not about the payee. Three limits are worth stating plainly:
- INTACT does not mean the vendor is legitimate. A fraudster can issue a perfectly clean invoice from a fake or hijacked supplier identity. The file is unmodified; the payee is still wrong.
- INTACT does not mean the bank details are correct. If the invoice was produced with the wrong account number in the first place, there is nothing in the file to detect. Only your own records and a call can catch that.
- MODIFIED is a statement about the file, not about intent. It says the document was changed after creation. It does not say who did it or why – there can be an innocent explanation – which is exactly why a call to the vendor is the next step.
Red flags that stop payment
Stop the payment and escalate if any of these is present:
- the file check shows modification
- bank details changed without a confirmed request from the vendor
- the vendor cannot confirm the invoice by phone, or the contact details came from the invoice itself
- pressure to skip the checks – an unusual deadline, a request for secrecy, or a request to pay outside the normal process
- a digital signature that Acrobat Reader reports as invalid on an invoice that should be signed
Investigate before paying if the sender address changed, the invoice number repeats or breaks the sequence, or the amount is out of line with the purchase order.
If something is wrong
Hold the payment, keep the original PDF, the email with headers and the verdict, and escalate to the finance controller. The general response steps – recalling a payment, reporting it, contacting the vendor – are in how to spot fake invoices. If the red flag is a bank-account change request rather than an invoice, see vendor bank change fraud, where the forged document is the bank letter itself.
Making the workflow routine
A check that depends on someone remembering is skipped under pressure. What makes this one stick in AP:
- Define the trigger. Every new vendor, every bank-detail change and every invoice above a set amount goes through the full workflow.
- Separate three roles. One person keys the invoice, another confirms the bank details, a third approves.
- Check at intake. The API lets your invoice inbox or AP system submit each PDF before an approver sees it; the integration guide shows the pattern.
- Attach the evidence to the invoice: verdict, who confirmed the details by phone and when, and the approval.
For the wider AP picture, read invoice fraud in accounts payable. To run this as a team process, the accounts-payable use case describes how HTPBE? fits in.
Summary
Before paying a PDF invoice:
- Keep the original file as it arrived
- Run the file check before the invoice is keyed in
- Read the verdict as a statement about the file, not the payee
- Compare the invoice with your own records
- Confirm new or changed bank details by phone, using a number from your own records
- Decide by verdict and keep the record
The file check catches an altered invoice. The call catches a convincing fake. Using both takes a few minutes and costs far less than a payment that cannot be recovered.